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In this paper, I propose a general taxonomy of diffe-
rent forms of eliminativism. In order to do so, I begin 
by exploring eliminativism from a broad perspective, 
providing a comparative picture of eliminativist projects in different 
domains. This exploration shows that eliminativism is a label used 
for a family of related types of eliminativist arguments and claims. 
The proposed taxonomy is an attempt to systematise those arguments 
and claims.
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Una propuesta de taxonomía para el eliminativismo
En este artículo, propongo una taxonomía general de 
diferentes formas de eliminativismo. Para alcanzar este 
propósito, comienzo por explorar el eliminativismo des-
de una perspectiva amplia, proporcionando un cuadro comparativo 
de proyectos eliminativistas en dominios distintos. Esta exploración 
muestra cómo el término ‘eliminativismo’ es utilizado para caracte-
rizar una familia de diversos tipos de afirmaciones y argumentos eli-
minativistas relacionados. La taxonomía propuesta es un intento de 
sistematización de dichos argumentos y afirmaciones.
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The topic of this paper is eliminativism. Essentially, eliminativ-
ism is the claim that denies the existence of some type of thing in 
the world. The first thing you notice when you start researching 
into this topic is that there is extensive literature about eliminativ-
ism regarding mental states and our commonsensical understanding 
of the mind. On the face of it, one might be led to believe that the 
scope of eliminativism is exhausted by the intricate debates about 
the mind that have been taking place among philosophers and cog-
nitive scientists. It is obvious that, if you are not familiar with those 
debates, you will find it difficult to understand what it is that, in 
the first place, there has been so much fuss about eliminating. This 
paper intends to take a step back and explore eliminativism from a 
broad perspective.
As we will see, people can be eliminativists about different 
things, which may belong in a variety of domains. For example, 
eliminativists may reject the existence of supernatural beings (e.g., 
Santa Claus, deities, trolls, fairies, etc.), biological classifications 
(e.g., species, races, cells, etc.), artefacts (e.g., chairs, doorknobs, 
etc.) and certain properties (e.g., colour, goodness, etc.). However, 
this does not mean to say that people holding eliminativist claims 
regarding these different types of things are all eliminativists in the 
same way. Examining different eliminativist arguments can show 
that there are different ways of denying that there are some X’s and, 
therefore, that there are different ways of being an eliminativist 
about X’s.
In general, whereas eliminativist claims seem to be alike in that 
they involve rejecting some candidate for eliminativism, there is 
not just one type of argument for eliminativism that applies to all 
of them. Indeed, it can be the case that arguments in two different 
domains are the same, while it can also be the case that there are 
different arguments within a common domain. Showing that this is 
the case will be the topic of the next three sections. The final sec-
tion is an attempt to systematize what seems to amount to a family 
of related types of eliminativist arguments and claims.
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Eliminating demons, chairs and moral properties
Some examples of eliminativism in different domains can offer 
a first glance at the diverse character of the eliminativist arguments 
and claims that this paper aims to examine. Let us consider the fol-
lowing cases of supernatural beings, artefacts, and moral properties, 
respectively.1
a) The case of demons
Belief in magic and the workings of supernatural beings is com-
mon to all human cultures and ascribing responsibility to demonic 
powers for causing certain health states and conditions (e.g., loss of 
sight, developmental abilities, or diseases such as epilepsy) is a com-
mon historical example of pre-theoretical explanations. Together 
with the expansion of our reliable knowledge about the workings of 
natural things in the world around us, demonic explanations have 
become increasingly unpopular. Most of us would be hardly willing 
to accept the involvement of magical or demonic causes in people’s 
health and diseases at the expense of natural causes as informed by 
current scientific enquiry. Thus, by denying the existence of demons 
to explain the exact causes of diseases, as well as any other natural 
events, many of us are now eliminativists about demons. Consider, 
for instance, the following remark made by Ramsey (2013) when 
commenting on eliminativism within the context of theory change.
The notion of a demon is just too far removed from anything we now posit 
to explain behavior that was once explained by demonology. […] We 
dropped demons from our current ontology, and came to realize that the 
notion is empty—it refers to nothing real. (Section 2.2, para. 3)
Underlying eliminativism about demons is a principle that we 
may call causal exclusion. According to this principle, if instances 
of a particular type of phenomenon are found to have causes of a 
certain kind, then there will be no causal room left for certain other 
supposed causes. Someone may go on to claim that entities whose 
presumed existence is proved unnecessary for explaining natural 
1 For clarity of exposition, I will focus on some paradigmatic version of the eliminativist arguments 
involved in each of these cases.
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phenomena are also ontologically suspect. For instance, given some 
demonic explanation that posits the existence of several supernatu-
ral entities in order to account for each of the currently known types 
of blindness due to infections, those hypothesised entities are candi-
dates for eliminativism because we now can account for the differ-
ent causes of visual impairment by natural causes (e.g., certain spe-
cific contagious microorganisms) without appealing to supernatural 
beings in ontological realms beyond the natural world.
Notice that eliminativism about demons by causal exclusion 
involves calling into question the existence of a putative type of en-
tity (namely, demons) not only due to their explanatory irrelevance 
but also due to the way in which they are irrelevant. In other words, 
the claim is that because demons play no explanatory role, since 
they are causally unnecessary, we are justified in inferring that they 
do not actually exist.
b) The case of chairs
We normally think of the world we inhabit as populated by 
familiar objects such as people, buildings, chairs, stars, etc. and it 
seems reasonable to believe that these familiar objects, together 
with their familiar properties (e.g., colour, texture, size, shape, etc.), 
are features of reality in their own right, in that they have their 
own existence out there in the external world. However, at least in 
the case of some of these objects, notably objects like buildings and 
chairs, our intuition above has been challenged.
In theorising about the metaphysics of artefacts, for instance, 
van Inwagen (1990) argues that the putative objects we call, say, 
a house, a ship or a chair are not really objects that exist in their 
own right. More specifically, his thought is that what really exists 
is not what we call artefacts but only the basic particles they are 
made of. So he does not deny that there is some physical stuff there 
where we claim an artefact is but, instead, he just thinks such stuff 
is not a thing in its own right. This view is compatible with saying 
that what we call a house, a ship, a chair, or the like, is only some 
subatomic particles arranged, say, housewise, shipwise or chairwise, 
etc. Hence, his conclusion that “There are, therefore, no tables and 
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chairs, and there are no other artifacts” (p. 127).2 In a similar vein, 
Elder (2007) describes the case of a carpenter who shapes pieces of 
wood in order to compose a desk and asks us to consider the ques-
tion “Is it just that certain pieces of wood or bundles of cellulose 
fibres have gotten arranged differently towards one another, or has 
some object different in kind from either the pieces or the bundles 
been created?” (p. 33).
Both Elder’s question about the putative creation of a new ob-
ject from the carpenter’s work and Inwagen’s explicit eliminativist 
conclusion about artefacts exemplify the problems regarding the on-
tological status of artefacts metaphysicians have been interested in. 
This problem can be characterized in terms of the following puzzle. 
On the one hand, contemporary metaphysicians have reasons to 
believe that artefacts are not part of a serious ontological inventory 
of the world. This claim does not amount to the assertion that there 
is nothing in the space where, say, a wooden chair is said to be, 
but, instead, that there are either just some pieces of wood or, even 
more strictly, that there is just some set of atoms in the void. On 
the other hand, there is a strong philosophical argument against the 
proposition that what we claim to be a given wooden chair and the 
pieces of wood (or, say, the bundles of cellulose fibres) it is made of 
are in a relation of identity with one another, in that the former and 
latter have all their properties in common (as per Leibniz’s Law). 
Consider that the chair and the pieces of wood differ in several ways 
from one another. For example, just as in the case of Elder’s desk, 
the pieces of wood in question existed before the chair was made, 
and they may continue to exist even if, as it might happen, the 
putative object chair was destroyed. Thus, the question arises as to 
whether the metaphysician is right when she claims that there are 
no such objects as chairs.
Let us focus on a version of the argument that artefacts such as 
chairs do not exist on the grounds that what we call a chair does 
not amount to an object in its own right. As Elder (2007) suggests, 
a common way to unpack this argument is in terms of certain wor-
2 For a related view, see Unger (1979), and for different views that challenge this conclusion, see, e.g., 
McGrath (2005), Baker (2007), and Elder (2007).
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ries about composition, where the issue to be decided is under what 
conditions things can compose an object (e.g., van Inwagen, 1990). 
So, for example, if someone claims that a proper object is the result 
of the combination between the carpenter’s intentional arrange-
ment of some pieces of wood and the uses to which people put that 
physical arrangement, then the question arises as to whether or not 
those intentional actions and uses are the kind of things that can 
be said to really compose a new object. The argument can be sum-
marised as follows:
Premise 1: There are things that can compose an object and   
  things that cannot 
Premise 2: Real composite objects are made of things that can   
  compose
Premise 3: Putative composite objects such as chairs are not   
  made up of things that can compose
Conclusion: Putative composite objects such as chairs are not   
  real composite objects
Consider that the eliminativist conclusion of this argument de-
pends on when composition occurs, given the metaphysical assump-
tion that composition occurs in some cases but not in others. So, 
eliminativism regarding chairs differs from eliminativism regarding 
demons in interesting ways. Firstly, rejecting chairs involves a case 
where the eliminativists deny that some physical stuff deserves to 
be taken as being a proper object, while rejecting demons involves 
a case where the elminativists simply claim that there are no physi-
cal instances of a given type of objects. Secondly, whereas rejecting 
the existence of demons is primarily the result of an epistemological 
concern (namely, whether demons exist depends on whether they 
play a causal role in explanation), rejecting chairs is primarily the 
result of a metaphysical concern (namely, when it is that a given 
collection of things that really exist within the space where some-
one claims a chair is deserves to be taken as an object in its own 
right). Finally, the elimination of chairs, but not the elimination 
of demons, is constrained in a principled way, namely, in virtue of 
the metaphysical notion of composition and the conditions for its 
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occurrence. Note that chair eliminativists of this persuasion can be 
united by their strong commitment to the metaphysical presump-
tion that the compositionality principle is the case even if they dis-
agree about its conditions for occurrence. Hence, since the elimina-
tivism regarding chairs can be said to be motivated by the violation 
of a presumed metaphysical principle, I will call it a case of elimina-
tion by strong metaphysical offence.
c) The case of moral properties and facts
Many of us think there are beliefs such as, for example, the be-
lief that the peak of Mount Everest is the furthest summit from the 
centre of the Earth, which can be true or false depending on how 
things are in the world. In other words, if it is actually the case that 
the peak of Mount Everest is the furthest summit from the centre 
of Earth, then the mentioned belief is true. Otherwise, the belief 
is false. The metaphysical subtext, in this case, is that there really 
are certain properties in the world (e.g., planets, mountains, etc.) 
and facts about the world (e.g., the fact that two objects are at a 
given relative distance from one another, etc.) that can make cer-
tain beliefs either true or false. Those of us who are committed to 
the existence of those types of properties and facts are realist about 
them. By contrast, those who reject the existence of those types of 
properties and facts are antirealist about them.
Likewise, there are those who can be said to be either realist 
or antirealist about moral properties and facts, that is, the putative 
kind of stuff in or about the world that is supposed to make moral 
beliefs true or false.3 Thus, if someone claims that moral beliefs (e.g., 
the belief that all human beings are naturally good; the belief that 
implementing government surveillance is harmful, etc.) are true in 
virtue of how the world is, then there is a presumption that they 
are committed to the existence of certain moral properties and facts 
(e.g., the property of goodness that something may have; the fact 
that a certain act is morally wrong; etc.). It follows from this that 
those who claim that no moral properties or facts exist will also 
3 A relevant analogy would be with realists or antirealists about the property of, say, being red, where 
being red is said to be either an objective or subjective property, respectively.
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have to claim that either moral beliefs can be neither true or false in 
virtue of how the world is or, simply, that those beliefs are always false.
Well, some people claim that moral beliefs are always false 
because no moral properties or facts are really part of the natural 
world.4 For the purposes of the present section, suffice it to focus 
on the main arguments supporting John Mackie’s thesis concerning 
the metaphysical status of morality. Mackie has advanced what may 
be called moral eliminativism5 or the claim that no moral facts or 
properties exist:
[…] what I have called moral scepticism is a negative doctrine, not a posi-
tive one: it says what there isn’t, not what there is. It says that there do 
not exist entities or relations of a certain kind, objective values or require-
ments, which many people have believed to exist. (1977, p. 17)
This claim is specifically about the metaphysical status of moral 
properties and the like and it does not entail rejecting common 
sense moral prescriptions. Indeed, Mackie’s moral eliminativism is 
compatible with accepting the usefulness of certain objectivist mor-
al language, including moral judgments with deontological form 
(e.g., “Governments ought to be ready to help refugees seeking 
safety”), so long as the explanation of the apparent objectivity and 
universalizability of the referents of such language does not appeal 
to the existence of moral properties and the like as part of the fabric 
of the world. The reason for this compatibility is that, while the 
universalizability of moral judgments could be validated by the ex-
istence of moral properties and facts, the converse does not hold. 
Hence, the validity (or invalidity) of arguments for or against moral 
judgments can be said to be independent from the validity (or inva-
lidity) of arguments for or against moral reality. As Mackie (1977) 
puts it, “The assertion that there are objective values […], which 
ordinary moral judgements presuppose, is, I hold, not meaningless, 
but false” (p. 40).
4 For a defence of an opposing claim, see, e.g., Shafer-Landau (2003), and Scanlon (2014).
5 In this paper I use ‘moral eliminativism’ and ‘moral properties and facts’ in the same way Mackie 
(1977) uses the terms ‘moral scepticism’ and ‘moral values’, respectively. My choice of terms is merely 
motivated by consistency of exposition throughout this work. Since nothing hangs on which of this 
terminology is chosen in this section, you may very well take them to mean the same.
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Mackie (1977) presents two main arguments against moral 
properties and facts, which take the form of two arguments for a 
species of Moral Error Theory—roughly, moral error theorists ac-
cept that there are moral claims but deny that they are actually 
true in virtue of how the world is. Mackie calls these arguments the 
argument from relativity and the argument from queerness, a version of 
each of which can be summarised in the following way.
In the case of the argument from relativity, it is first stated that, 
if there were objective values (i.e. if moral facts and properties were 
part of the fabric of the world), people would tend to agree about 
their moral views. However, (as the argument goes on), disagree-
ment and variation in moral views is abundant across and within 
different societies, classes and periods. Moreover, (it is then stated), 
abundant disagreement about moral views is better explained by 
people’s adherence to and participation in different ways of life, 
rather than by the existence of objective values. Therefore, (as the 
argument concludes), there are no objective moral values.
The argument from queerness is made up of two components, one 
is metaphysical and the other is epistemological. Given that the episte-
mological component is dependent on the metaphysical component, I 
think it is a good idea to combine both parts into a single argument in 
order to make that dependence explicit. Thus, the eliminativist argu-
ment Mackie (1977) defends can be set out in the following way. First-
ly, (Premise 1) morality is committed to very strange or bizarre proper-
ties (viz., moral properties) which we could only track by some very 
special perceptual or discerning faculty. Hence, (Premise 2) if there 
were objective values, the world would have to be such that it contains 
very strange and bizarre entities or qualities which are “utterly different 
from anything else in the universe” (p. 38) and we would have to pos-
sess some very special perceptual or discerning faculty which is “utterly 
different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else” (p. 38). 
But, (Premise 3) very queer qualities and perceptual faculties are not to 
be taken seriously. Therefore, there are no objective values.
How does moral eliminativism compare with eliminativisms re-
garding demons and chairs? To begin with, whereas rejecting demons 
involves rejecting the existence of a putative type of objects, moral 
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eliminativism involves rejecting the existence of both a putative type 
of objective properties attributed to proper objects as well as putative 
objective fact-like referents of moral judgments. In turn, while elimina-
tivism regarding chairs is committed to a metaphysical principle, moral 
eliminativism as examined above is committed to the falsehood moral 
judgments, which rules out the metaphysical reality of objective values. 
Finally, moral eliminativism, but not demons eliminativism (and less 
clear in the case of eliminativism regarding chairs),6 allows for an inde-
pendent account of the objectification of common-sense belief in the 
corresponding candidate for eliminativism. That is, moral eliminativ-
ism allows for there being some kind of objective common-sense moral 
claims without there being objective moral facts or properties.
The argument for moral eliminativism is a kind of argument 
which is primarily motivated by the presumption that putative ob-
jects whose metaphysics is too strange or confused do not really ex-
ist. Accordingly, I will refer to this type of arguments as eliminativ-
ist arguments by metaphysical vagueness.
So far, I have briefly presented three different examples of elimi-
nativism which provides us with a general idea of the kinds of issues 
that may be at stake when someone intends to argue for the claim 
that some type of things in the world do not really exist. In particu-
lar, examples (a), (b) and (c) show that eliminativist claims arise 
across a wide range of domains. They also show that there is clearly 
not just one argument at work for all different types of eliminativ-
ist claims. I am now in a position to distinguish different types of 
eliminativist arguments and I will do so by taking a closer look at 
some prominent eliminativist projects.
Different types of eliminativist arguments
In this section, I will focus on eliminativist arguments in differ-
ent domains. No special attention will be paid to objections that 
may have been made to these arguments. The goal is to present 
6 Someone might think that talk of chairs and moral properties are alike because they are confined to 
non-scientific domains such as folk talk of artefacts and common sense normative claims, but then 
again, artefacts are sometimes accepted as proper natural kinds (e.g., in the field of paleoanthropology) 
and, hence, as objects of scientific enquiry (see, e.g., Machery, 2009, section 8.2.1)
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and illustrate a list of arguments that have actually been given for 
eliminativism. A discussion on how these arguments compare and 
contrast will help us advance a general taxonomy of eliminativism, 
which is to be the focus of the last section.
Elimination of propositional attitudes
A common intuition is that people’s behaviour is somehow de-
termined by their inner mental states and processes. This intuition 
is reflected in our daily mentalistic discourse such as, for example, 
when I explain my daughter’s decision to postpone her planned pic-
nic in the park due to bad weather by saying that she believes the 
rain would ruin the picnic and desires to have a good time with 
her friends. The explanatory and predictive powers of this common 
sense understanding of the way our minds affect our behaviour have 
motivated the idea that such understanding really embodies a true 
theory of our mental life. Roughly, a view like this claims that men-
tal states such as beliefs and desires are real inner states with causal 
powers and that common sense psychology (also known as folk psy-
chology) presupposes law-like generalizations of the following type: 
If someone desires that X and believes that the best way to get X is 
by doing Y, then (all else being equal) she will intend to do Y.
Some cognitive scientists (e.g., Fodor, 1987) think science will 
eventually vindicate common-sense psychology and the existence 
of mental phenomena as described above. Others think otherwise. 
Consider the following thesis defended by Churchland:
[…] our commonsense conception of psychological phenomena con-
stitutes a radically false theory, a theory so fundamentally defective 
that both the principles and the ontology of that theory will eventu-
ally be displaced, rather than smoothly reduced, by completed neuro-
science. (1981, p. 67)
In order to justify this radical claim, known as Eliminative Ma-
terialism, Churchland puts forward an argument that takes three 
main steps. In the first step, it is argued that common-sense psy-
chology constitutes an empirical theory whose central posits are so-
called propositional attitudes. As their name suggests, proposi-
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tional attitudes are normally characterized as the combination of 
attitudes (e.g., believing, desiring, hoping, etc.) and propositions 
(e.g., “there is bad weather”). According to Churchland, the 
structure of common-sense psychology resembles that of some 
physical sciences, the difference being the domain of abstract 
entities over which they quantify. For instance, while law-like 
relations in mathematical physics exploit numbers, law-like gen-
eralizations in common-sense psychology exploit propositions. 
Recognizing the theoretical status of common-sense psychology, 
Churchland claims, allows for a plausible explanation of several 
issues, including, among others, the explanation and prediction 
of behaviour. He thus concludes that there are good reasons for 
theorists to take the theoretical status of common-sense psychol-
ogy seriously.
If common-sense psychology is really an empirical theory, 
then it is possible for this theory to be refuted and, hence, for 
its set of theoretical posits to be displaced. Accordingly, in a 
second step, Churchland argues that common-sense psychology 
is deeply mistaken on the grounds that it has a very limited ex-
planatory scope (e.g., it provides no accounts of mental illness 
or learning processes involving infants and other animals); it is 
a stagnant theory—“The FP of the Greeks is essentially the FP 
we use today” (Churchland, 1981, p. 74)—and it is just as unre-
liable as other unscientific theories (e.g., alchemy and cosmol-
ogy); and it is incoherent with the rest of the sciences in that 
it is not reducible to any other physical science. In his words, 
“Any theory that meets this description must be allowed a seri-
ous candidate for outright elimination” (p. 76). Thus, the third 
and final step of Churchland’s argument consists of the radical 
conclusion that, because a theory of propositional attitudes is 
deeply mistaken, we are justified in inferring that its central posits 
do not really exist.
The eliminativist conclusion regarding propositional attitudes 
championed by Churchland can be made explicit in the following 
argument, adapted from Stich (1983 and 1996):
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Premise 1: Propositional attitudes are the posits of a common-sense  
 psychological theory called “folk psychology”
Premise 2: Folk psychology is a deeply mistaken theory of the human  
 brain/mind because it epically fails to provide a reductive  
 and coherent explanation of the workings of the human  
 brain/mind
Premise 3: The posits of deeply mistaken theories do not exist 
Conclusion: Propositional attitudes do not exist
As the second premise of this argument suggests, what is at stake 
in Churchland’s argument against the tenability of common-sense 
psychology is whether or not there are reasons to think that this 
folk theory is likely to be vindicated scientifically.7 Thus, because 
the eliminativist conclusion of the argument is said to hang on a 
total failure to meet the requirements for such vindication, argu-
ments of this kind can be dubbed eliminativist arguments by total 
explanatory failure.
Compared to other eliminativist arguments, elimination by to-
tal explanatory failure is closer to elimination by causal exclusion 
in that both of them invoke some explanatory drawback as a cru-
cial argumentative step. For example, while propositional attitudes 
are said to fail to explain the causes of behaviour, demons are said 
to fail to explain the causes of certain diseases. Indeed, these two 
types of arguments involve candidates for elimination that are said 
to be part an explanation of a given phenomenon, though perhaps 
an explanation no longer regarded as correct by current scientific 
theory. However, eliminativism regarding propositional attitudes 
and eliminativism regarding demons differ in an interesting respect, 
namely, in the way they failed to be scientifically relevant. While 
rejecting demons is a case where the replacing type of entities (e.g., 
micro-organisms) is supposed to explain the same type of phenom-
ena (e.g., loss of sight) formerly attributed to the replaced type of 
entities (e.g., demons), rejecting propositional attitudes is a case 
where such kind of replacement is out of the question. In this latter 
case, given that common-sense psychology is said to have gone ut-
7 Indeed, it can be said that, regarding the prospects of scientific vindication of Folk Psychology, the jury 
is still out. For various defences of Folk Psychology, see, e.g., Horgan & Woodward (1985), Kitcher 
(1984), Fodor (1987), and Lahav (1992).
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terly wrong, the eliminativist’s claim is that the theory is also mis-
taken about the type of phenomena of which it is supposed to be a 
misdescription.
Someone might want to insist that, because in both cases there 
do seem to be phenomena that are in need of some explanation (viz., 
why people act as they do, and why people fall sick), one should feel 
inclined to conclude that there is no significant difference between 
eliminativism about propositional attitudes and eliminativism about 
demons. However, when taking a closer look at the way in which de-
mons and propositional attitudes are said to fail to be the central pos-
its of explanatory theories, it is clear that only propositional attitudes 
and their causal relation to our behaviour can be accepted as the posits 
of a certain legitimate scientific contender. The reason for this is that 
psychological explanation in terms of propositional attitudes is meant 
to provide an empirical and naturalistic account of the causes of be-
haviour, so what the eliminativist thinks is that there must be some 
more adequate explanation of the causes of behaviour, even though 
what it is is not yet known to science. By contrast, for the eliminativist 
regarding demons, even though there is room in scientific theorising 
for episodes that are taken to be instances of demonic possession, there 
is no room for instances of demonic possession in scientific theorising 
about the causes of certain illnesses, since demons are not meant to be 
legitimate objects of scientific study.8 In this sense, while there could 
be said to be no reason to posit psychological explanations that appeal 
to propositional attitudes (e.g., because there might be better empirical 
alternative), there would seem to be every reason not to posit explana-
tions in terms of demonic possession.
To make this latter point clearer, let us roughly consider a re-
cent trend in philosophy of physics called eliminative structural real-
ism (ESR).9 Scientific theories normally posit unobservable entities 
in order to explain observable phenomena. Extensive philosophi-
8 Of course, someone might claim that there can be realists regarding both propositional attitudes and 
demons, but, then again, the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate objects of study remains 
since only the realist about propositional attitudes is committed to the kind of realism that is scientifi-
cally relevant (i.e., one which is aimed at reflecting the casual structure of the world without appealing 
to supernatural beliefs).
9 I thank an anonymous reviewer for drawing my attention to ESR.
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cal debates about scientific realism have centred around the issue of 
whether or not we are justified in inferring that those unobservable 
entities are correctly described by scientific theories (see, e.g., Lady-
man, 2016). Standard scientific realism is the optimistic view that our 
best scientific theories are successful because they are (at least, ap-
proximately) true, and structural realism (SR) is a form of scientific re-
alism.10 According to SR, we should epistemically commit ourselves 
to the structural content of our theories, not to belief in the nature of 
the unobservable world. When combined with the ontological claim 
that there are no objects and that structure is all there is, so-called on-
tic structural realism obtains (OSR). ESR is a form of OSR, a promi-
nent defence of which can be found in French (2014). In his view,
we can still utter truths about, and in general talk of, physical objects, 
while eliminating them from our fundamental ontology in favour of 
structure. (2014, p. viii)
Since French takes that structure to be physical, ESR is another 
case where certain unobservable objects are eliminated because 
they are thought to be explanatorily irrelevant, without challeng-
ing the commitment to scientific realism.
Elimination of races
Among both scholars and ordinary people, there are those who 
have appealed to a putative biologically-grounded notion of races to 
distinguish alleged natural divisions and subdivisions among human 
beings (e.g., Caucasian, African, Asian, Spaniard, Amerindian, 
etc.). One recurrent assumption behind this practice is that these 
divisions are biologically real, in that they would have biological 
foundations which are made manifest in physical and behavioural 
features such as skin colour, eye shape, health status, intelligence, 
etc. Despite this persistent tendency to categorize human beings 
into different races on those foundations, eliminativism is a widely 
held view about biological races nowadays.11
10 Popularised by Worrall (1989), ‘structural realism’ is an umbrella term that encompasses a cluster of 
related positions in philosophy of physics.
11 For arguments defending the existence of races on different grounds, see, e.g., Gooding-Williams 
(1998), Andreasen (2004), and Sesardic (2010).  
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The question that biological race eliminativists answer nega-
tively is whether there are races, given their informed judgment that 
there are no biological grounds for distinguishing human beings into 
distinct and discrete categories of the sort. A common understand-
ing of these grounds is in terms of some type of essences, such as, 
for example, certain genetic properties, given the belief that these 
essences can determine certain visible physical traits. However, as 
the current scientific consensus in this respect suggests, there is no 
evidence to support the view that there is a significant correlation 
between people who share phenotypic features and any particular 
biological conception of essences. Indeed, genetic change does not 
always result in physically visible characteristics and (contrary to 
popular belief) even the most visible physical traits fail to work as 
a criterion to distinguish putative racial groups. For example, Zack 
(2002) has objected to the idea that the skin colour can be used 
to distinguish racial groups on the grounds that, because people’s 
skin tones vary gradually rather than discretely, it is not possible 
to say that people with certain skin tone (e.g., white) always differ 
from people with a different skin tone (e.g., black) in the same way. 
Moreover, people who are classified into different races can some-
times be judged to differ from one another less than some people 
who are supposed to be of the same race. Thus, as the argument 
goes, because there is no notion of essences that can be said to bio-
logically ground divisions of human beings in terms of visible physi-
cal traits, there are no grounds for the existence of a scientifically-
interesting category of race. If scientific realism is embraced, such 
as in the case of Zack (2002), then being an eliminativist about the 
scientific category of race amounts to a metaphysical claim regard-
ing the putative category of race, just as with other displaced pre-
scientific notions such as phlogiston, humors, etc.
Consider how the case of eliminativism regarding races com-
pares and contrasts with the other cases of eliminativism that we 
have already discussed. When characterising the case of eliminativ-
ism by causal exclusion, it was taken as a matter of fact that there is 
nothing in the world that counts as an instance of the type of things 
that demons are supposed to be. By contrast, rejecting races does 
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not deny that the entities (viz., people) that are labelled “white 
person” or “black person” exist. Instead, the claim is that our com-
monsensical way of thinking about races does not correspond to a 
real category on the grounds that it does not amount to a scientifi-
cally grounded category. Put differently, while the one claim is that 
nothing is actually an instance of a putative given kind (viz., the 
class of demons), the other claim is something like, given certain 
superficial differences among people, whatever they might be an 
instance of, they are not an instance of a given putative kind (viz., 
the category of races). Thus, resorting to the standard conception of 
a type/token distinction, to say that there are no demons by causal 
exclusion means that it is explanatorily irrelevant to assume that 
there are tokens of some type of things. Conversely, to say that there 
are no scientifically grounded races means that it is unwarranted to 
assume that there is a certain type of things in itself.
Note that this latter claim also applies when contrasting two 
different arguments. For instance, it would appear that the argu-
ment against races resonates with the argument against chairs in 
that both of them involve the conclusion that something we think 
is real is really something that should not be taken to be real in 
its own right. However, this is not the case, since in the argument 
against races, not in the argument against chairs, the conclusion ac-
cepts the type/token characterisation above. More specifically, what 
a chair eliminativist denies is that there are certain objects (viz., 
chairs) that are tokens of a certain type of things which is com-
pletely different from the type of things that the subatomic particles 
making up the objects are tokens of.
Is the argument against races an eliminativist argument by total 
explanatory failure just as the argument against propositional attitudes 
is? In some important respects, the answer to this question is yes. Con-
sider that, if races are to be rejected from scientific taxonomy, it is, 
presumably, because this putative category fails to be relevant for sup-
porting many scientific inductions about groups of human beings or the 
individuals that are said to belong to those groups. If so, the elimination 
of races could also be conceived of as a case where the existence of 
a given type of things is denied on the basis of explanatory failure. 
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However, as in the case of moral eliminativism regarding the 
need to develop some theory of common sense morality without ap-
pealing to the existence of objective moral values, race eliminativ-
ists do not need to reject what we may call talk of races. Recall that 
in Zack’s argument, just as in the case of Mackie’s argument, the 
eliminativist conclusion is negative in that it is about what there 
is not, not what there is. So, there is still room for what both au-
thors present as some alternative understanding of race and moral 
talk, respectively. Indeed, what each of them proposes is an account 
about certain types of things that we know are false but about which 
it is somehow good to keep talking (e.g., race talk might still be use-
ful to discuss, characterise and resist certain forms of discrimination 
and attitudes towards specific social groups and communities which 
we could not otherwise effectively identify).
The notion of talk of x I have just introduced deserves further 
clarification. Eliminativists about a given type of things typically 
go on to make a further claim which, even though they also label 
as ‘eliminativism’, is not a metaphysical claim at all. To make this 
point palpable, let us first consider the distinction Mallon makes 
between normative eliminativism and metaphysical eliminativism:
Typically there is a close association between metaphysical positions 
on race and normative positions on ‘race’ talk. Racial sceptics typical-
ly hold that the nonexistence of race supports ‘race’ talk eliminativism. 
Since race does not exist, it would be false and misleading to continue 
to use ‘race’ talk as if it does. (2006, p. 526; emphasis in original)12
As Mallon points out, what eliminativists normally argue from 
their conclusion that there are no races is that the concept of race 
should be avoided. However, as we will see, it is perfectly possible 
that metaphysical eliminativism regarding X does not support nor-
mative eliminativism regarding our talk of X. For example, Mackie 
(1977) thinks that, because there are no objective moral properties 
or facts, morality is not to be understood as the result of discovery, 
but as something that is to be made. Roughly, the idea is that issues 
12  Mallon uses the term ‘racial scepticism’ for the metaphysical view that races do not exist at all.
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regarding, say, what moral views to adhere to are to be the result of 
a decision-making process that yields certain principles of conduct 
for guiding or controlling people’s choices of action. In this sense, 
even though Mackie denies there are objective moral properties, he 
is, at the same time, committed to the use of moral talk (i.e., the use 
of moral terms or concepts) that can play a role in evaluating hu-
man conduct. Likewise, Mallon’s distinction between metaphysical 
positions on race and normative positions on race talk in the quote 
above allows us to better understand cases where eliminativists re-
garding the existence of races can be, at the same time, advocates 
of race talk. Indeed, the form of race eliminativism put forward by 
Zack (2002) exemplifies such a case in that, even though she claims 
that races of any type do not exist, she also defends an alternative 
view of races (viz., a form of racial constructivism) according to 
which racial categories  are socio-culturally constructed. In such a 
view, whereas the term ‘race’ is scientifically otiose, it can very well 
play a meaningful role in promoting, for example, race-based af-
firmative action aimed at favouring the well-being of members of 
certain disadvantaged groups.
The distinction between metaphysical and normative elimina-
tivist positions I have just introduced will be useful at the moment 
of drawing some general conclusions about eliminativist arguments, 
so I will come back to it in the later sections of this paper. For now, 
suffice it to conclude our characterisation of the argument against 
the existence of biologically-grounded races by noting what I take 
to be one of its most salient features, namely its weak defence of 
the elimination of racial terms from scientific taxonomy. As I men-
tioned before, this argument is about what there is not, in that it 
denies that there are races in the world, arguing for the scientific 
elimination of racial terms without defending a scientific alterna-
tive. The argument also states, as a central reason for its elimina-
tivist conclusion, that there are no plausible biological grounds for 
racial groupings, grounds which have been characterised in certain 
specific ways. However, it is still possible for someone to argue, for 
example, that there can be natural racial groupings which do not 
appeal to those particular foundations, but, instead, to other foun-
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dations that may or may not be biological. Likewise, it is possible 
to argue that, just as it is useful for us to retain racial talk for social 
or political reasons, scientists may very well retain racial taxonomy 
even if they doubt that there are biologically-grounded racial group-
ings, so long as race talk can help discover generalizations about, 
say, human behaviour or the like. Thus, since arguments of this type 
are essentially meant to support a negative conclusion, I will dub 
them eliminativist arguments by weak metaphysical offence.
Elimination of the innate
Within the context of philosophical psychology, the questions 
of what innateness is and what it means to say that a given trait is in-
nate are said to have no clear answers. Cowie (2009)13 characterises 
at least 16 different ways in which the concept of innateness has been 
understood, which, in her opinion, reflect the state of disarray the 
notion of innateness is in. Since there is no common way in which 
all these different understandings of this notion can be analysed, 
it is not surprising that some people have felt tempted to question 
its explanatory usefulness and advocate its ostracism from scientific 
theorising (e.g., Griffiths, 2002). Cowie offers an instructive discus-
sion on whether there is a plausible case for the eliminativist op-
tion with respect to the innate. She dubs this option as the case for 
ElimiNativism. Importantly for the purposes of this section, Cowie’s 
discussion provides us with a general taxonomy of different types of 
eliminativist views regarding the innate.14
According to Cowie, arguments supporting elimiNativism can 
be initially distinguished in terms of two different kinds of elimi-
nativist projects which she calls ontological and linguistic (or 
conceptual),15 respectively. The question the ontological elimiNa-
tivist attempts to answer is whether a given trait in the world is in-
nate. The question the linguistic elimiNativist attempts to answer 
13 Unless otherwise indicated, all reference to Cowie’s work in this section corresponds to Cowie (2009).
14 Even though Cowie (2009) is specifically interested in assessing Stich’s position regarding elimiNati-
vism, I will mainly focus on her proposed general taxonomy of eliminativist arguments with respect to 
the innate.
15 With respect to eliminativism, Cowie (2009) makes no distinctions of usage between ‘terms’ and ‘con-
cepts’. Since nothing in this section is meant to hang on this distinction, I will use these terms inter-
changeably too.
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is whether or not the term ‘innate’ plays a useful explanatory role in 
philosophical or scientific theorizing about cognition.
While being distinct from one another, these two projects are 
also related. Thus, just as there can be reasons to think that theo-
rists should stop using a given theoretical term on the grounds that 
the putative type of objects that the term purports to refer to does 
not really exist, there can be reasons to continue with its use. Cowie 
mentions the case of ‘centres of gravity’ in different contexts and 
that of ‘electron’ (as referring to pure particles) in chemistry, but 
we have also discussed the similar case of ‘race’ and its normative 
relevance. Alternatively, theorists sometimes conclude that some 
putative type of objects does not really exist from the realisation 
that the terms used to refer to them (e.g., ‘ether’, ‘soul’, etc.) are not 
fit for a serious explanatory theory. However, there are terms which, 
even though theorists would deem them not fit for philosophical or 
scientific theorising, refer to certain types of things whose existence 
would not be easy to deny. Cowie mentions terms such as ‘sock’, 
‘dirty joke’ and ‘herb’, but we have also discussed the similar case of 
‘chair’ and other artefacts.
Together with the previous distinction, Cowie also distinguishes 
between three kinds of eliminativist arguments in philosophy, ar-
guments she invokes to evaluate their possible application regard-
ing the innate. She calls them ‘Aren’t Any’ eliminativism, ‘Doesn’t 
Work’ eliminativism and ‘It’s a Mess’ eliminativism, respectively. 
Let us have a look at each of them in turn.
Aren’t Any eliminativist arguments are said to be aimed at the onto-
logical eliminativist project and, sometimes, at the linguistic one. Their 
eliminativist conclusions normally derive from the realisation that 
nothing in the world satisfies the analysis of a given concept. Cowie 
thinks Stich (1983) provides a suitable example of this first type of 
arguments, since Stich’s argument that there are no such things as 
beliefs derives from the realisation that nothing really satisfies the 
analysis of the term ‘belief’. Cowie’s reconstruction of Stich’s argu-
ment against the existence of beliefs can be set out in three main 
premises and an eliminativist conclusion. The first premise states 
that a scientific taxonomy of mental states does not admit states 
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that are individuated in terms of content. The second premise states 
that the folk psychological term of ‘belief’ is inconsistent with a sci-
entific taxonomy of mental states because ‘belief’ is supposed to des-
ignate mental states that are essentially individuated in terms of its 
content. The third premise states that the putative type of entities 
designated by folk psychological terms that are inconsistent with a 
scientific taxonomy of mental states must be eliminated. Accord-
ingly, the conclusion of the argument is that beliefs are a putative 
type of entities that must be eliminated.
One way in which this argument could work in the case of in-
nateness, as Cowie notes, is by establishing that there is something 
that can be said to be essential to the concept ‘innate’. Thus, if this 
was the case, an elimiNativist could attempt to defend the conclu-
sion of Aren’t Any eliminativist arguments of the following form:
Premise 1:  A scientific taxonomy of psychological traits T does not ad-
mit traits that are individuated by the essential property K
Premise 2:  A scientific taxonomy of psychological traits T is incon 
sistent with the folk term ‘innate’ because this term de 
signates a putative type of traits that are individuated by 
the essential property K
Premise 3:  Putative types of traits designated by terms that are in-
consistent with a scientific taxonomy of psychological 
traits T must be eliminated
Conclusion:  Innateness is a putative type of traits which must be 
eliminated
Doesn’t Work eliminativist arguments are said to be primarily 
aimed at the linguistic eliminativist project and their eliminativ-
ist conclusions derive from the realisation that the concept under 
analysis is part of what Cowie calls a bankrupt theory (i.e., a to-
tally inadequate or scientifically useless explanatory theory). This 
form of argument is exemplified in the case against propositional 
attitudes of folk psychology defended by Churchland (1981). I dis-
cussed this argument at the beginning of this section as an example 
of Total Explanatory Failure eliminativism, so I will not reproduce 
it here. Instead, I will present the form such type of argument could 
take if it was to apply for in the case of elimiNativism.
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First, the elimiNativist would need to argue that the nativist’s 
research program is part of an empirical theory. Then, she would 
have to show that such a theory is part of a degenerating research 
program which simply cannot be scientifically vindicated. The final 
step would have to argue from such scientific failure to the conclu-
sion that the folk concept of innateness should be abandoned. The 
general argument can be set out as follows:
Premise 1: The concept of ‘innate’ is part of an empirical theory
Premise 2: The theory the concept of innate is part of is a totally degen-
erate and inadequate scientific program
Premise 3: The concepts of totally degenerate and inadequate scientific 
programs should be eliminated
Conclusion: The concept ‘innate’ should be eliminated
Finally, It’s a Mess eliminativist arguments are said to be primarily 
aimed at the linguistic eliminativist project, but they can sometimes be 
taken to support the ontological project too. Their eliminativist con-
clusions derive from the realisation that a given concept simply has no 
determinate analysis on the grounds that it is too vague or confused 
for useful explanatory purposes. Cowie illustrates this type of argument 
along the lines of proposals developed by Griffiths (e.g., 2002), Bateson 
(e.g., 1991) and Mameli & Bateson (2005). The general form of an It’s 
a Mess elimiNativist argument can be set out as follows:
Premise 1: ‘Innate’ is a (hopelessly) mudded and vague term that re-
sists analysis
Premise 2: (Hopelessly) mudded and vague terms that resist analysis  
 should be eliminated from scientific theorising
Conclusion: The term ‘innate’ should be eliminated from scientific  
theorising
Just as in the case of Total Explanatory Failure eliminativism re-
garding propositional attitudes, It’s a Mess linguistic elimiNativism 
can flirt with Its ontological counterpart, but, again, the linguistic 
eliminativist conclusion of the one does not directly entail the on-
tological conclusion of the other. Thus, the challenge for the It’s a 
Mess linguistic elimiNativist is to provide some additional premises 
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to the previous argument such that it can be possible to derive the 
claim that nothing in the world is innate from the claim that ‘innate’ 
is unsuitable for scientific purposes. 
Cowie points out an interesting issue arising from this latter 
alternative: concepts that are deemed intractably vague and too 
messy to be taken seriously can, at the same time, play a produc-
tive scientific role. This consideration may not prevent us from 
rejecting those concepts. An eliminative attitude towards certain 
useful yet imprecise terms is also exemplified in Quine’s concerns 
regarding the ontological commitments of our scientific theories. 
Quine (2013) thought that the terms of our ordinary language fail 
to clearly pick out objects that we could take to really exist. For us 
to be a in position to commit ourselves to some ontological claim, 
further systematization or regimentation of the language of science is 
in order, which, in his view, should be done by means of a formal 
language. As a result of formal refinement, ontological commit-
ments of ordinary discourse can be either retained or abandoned (as 
per ontological reduction), depending on whether or not we want 
to keep the roles we formerly attributed to the objects of the defec-
tive expressions.
According to Quine, defining or explicating philosophical prob-
lems by showing that they are the result of verbal confusions is part 
of the process of regimenting our theories. He illustrates this point 
with the concept of ordered pair in set theory, where several ways 
of defining that concept makes it unnecessary that we commit our-
selves to the existence of the entities we call ‘ordered pair’. Hence 
the idea that explication is elimination:
We have, to begin with, an expression or form of expression that is 
somehow troublesome. It behaves partly like a term but not enough 
so, or it is vague in ways that bother us, or it puts kinks in a theory or 
encourages one or another confusion. But also it serves certain purposes 
that are not to be abandoned. Then we find a way of accomplishing those 
same purposes through other channels, using other and less trouble-
some forms of expression. The old perplexities are resolved. (2013, pp. 
239-240, emphasis added)
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As Quine suggests, terms which are troublesome or confused 
can be deemed ripe for elimination, irrespective of their provisional 
scientific utility and convenience. I agree with the importance of 
this observation, so, for my own classificatory purposes, I will char-
acterise eliminativist arguments appealing to the theoretical vague-
ness of certain scientific concepts (e.g., memory, gene, centre of 
gravity, etc.) as eliminativist arguments by explanatory vagueness.
Types of eliminativist claims
I am now in a position to present a classification of different 
types of eliminativist claims. I will do so in a way that benefits from 
the distinction Cowie (2009) advances between ontological and lin-
guistic eliminativist projects. Roughly, the first project asks whether 
some type of objects exists or whether a given property is instanti-
ated in the world, and the second is aimed at deciding whether a 
given theoretical term should be used or abandoned for scientific 
theorizing. Since eliminativists are not always explicit about the 
precise scope of their claims regarding the previous distinction, it 
will be useful to set out our classification in such a way that it allows 
us to discriminate cases in which the eliminativist claims are non-
committal to either the ontological or linguistic projects. Accord-
ingly, a general classification of eliminativist claims can be made in 
terms of the following three categories:
A. Claims which are committed to both ontological and lin-
guistic elimination
B. Claims which are austerely committed to either ontological 
or linguistic elimination
C. Claims which are indulgently committed to either onto-
logical or linguistic elimination
Type A claims are explicitly committed to the elimination 
of some type of things in the world (e.g., beliefs) and the aban-
donment of the terms used to refer to those things (e.g., the term 
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‘belief’).16 Type B claims, in turn, are explicitly committed to only 
one of the two eliminativist projects and, at the same time, they are 
neutral or non-committal about their corresponding counterparts. 
This is the case of the eliminativist claims connected with the three 
types of elimiNativisms exactly as characterised by Cowie (2009), 
where each type of eliminativism regarding the innate is primarily 
aimed at only one of the two projects (namely, either ontological 
elimination of X or linguistic elimination of ‘X’). The eliminativist 
claim about artefacts is another example of type B claims, in the 
sense that it strictly focuses on the metaphysical question. Finally, 
type C claims can be exemplified by the eliminativist claims about 
race and moral properties discussed in section 3, both of which are 
committed to ontological eliminativism yet permissive (and inclu-
sive) about the elimination of the corresponding theoretical terms 
ordinarily used to talk about races and moral properties, respectively 
(cf. the case of the fruitful usage of the term ‘gene’ as illustrated in 
Cowie 2009 with respect of its historical development).
With this general classification of claims in hand, I will now 
turn to supply a classification of the different types of eliminativist 
arguments discussed in this paper. This new classification will build 
on Cowie’s proposed taxonomy of different kinds of arguments for 
elimiNativism and the classification of eliminativist claims pro-
posed in this section.
A taxonomy of eliminativist arguments
As it pertains to contemporary philosophical and scientific 
theorising, it is reasonable to think that the main motivation for 
eliminativists to argue for the elimination of some X is the thought 
that X fails to be useful for gaining better understanding of the way 
things really work in nature. In view of that, in this section I will 
use ‘theoretical adequacy’ as an umbrella concept to draw a general 
classification of eliminativist arguments. Roughly, for some X to 
be theoretically adequate, it should satisfy conditions for adequate 
16  Consider the case against our folk concept of ‘emotion’ pursued by Griffiths (1997). 
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explanations such as the facilitation of inductive generalisations 
and hypothesis generation, theoretical unification, coherence with 
whatever reliable knowledge we may already have, and the like.
Given the assumption that a certain candidate for eliminativ-
ism is thought to fail to meet some kind of conditions for theoretical 
adequacy, different types of eliminativist arguments can be initially 
sorted out according to three main categories—irrespectively of how 
good or bad arguments they can be. Call them Eliminativism due to 
offence to metaphysical presumption (Metaphysical Eliminativism), 
causal/explanatory inadequacy (Causal/Explanatory Eliminativism), 
and heterogeneity (Heterogeneity Eliminativism). These categories 
are intended to generalise from what Cowie (2009) characterises as 
Aren’t Any, Doesn’t Work, and It’s a Mess elimiNativism, respec-
tively. Each of the three broad categories proposed here comprises 
a number of subcategories, where the several types of eliminativist 
arguments already explored can be allocated (see table 1, below).
The category of arguments which are theoretically inadequate 
as per Metaphysical Eliminativism comprises two subcategories, 
namely eliminativist arguments due to strong metaphysical offence 
and eliminativist arguments due to weak metaphysical offence. 
Strong metaphysical offence eliminativism (e.g., artefact elimina-
tivism) argues that the existence of some type of thing should be re-
jected due to the violation of a certain metaphysical principle (e.g., 
the principle of ‘compositionality’ introduced in section 2). These 
arguments are aimed at ontological eliminativism, but they are neu-
tral about linguistic or conceptual eliminativism (e.g., artefact elim-
inativists do not explicitly claim that talking about chairs should 
be avoided in, say, paleoanthropological research). Regarding our 
previous classification of claim types, eliminativism by strong meta-
physical offence should be associated with type B claims. Likewise, 
eliminativist arguments due to weak metaphysical offence are aimed 
at ontological eliminativism (e.g., there aren’t essential properties 
for races), but, since these arguments are explicitly permissive re-
garding the theoretical terms used to talk about the objects that are 
candidates for ontological eliminativism, these arguments are best 
associated with type C claims.
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Arguments which are theoretically inadequate as per Causal/Ex-
planatory Eliminativism include what I have called eliminativism by 
causal exclusion and eliminativism due to total explanatory failure. 
Eliminativism by causal exclusion (e.g., eliminativism regarding de-
mons, phlogiston, humors, etc.) argues that the existence of X should 
be rejected because X is causally irrelevant for a scientifically relevant 
explanatory theory, especially one that is committed to scientific re-
alism or one that can be falsified. Eliminativism by Total Explana-
tory Failure (e.g., eliminativism regarding propositional attitudes) ar-
gues that X should be rejected because X is part of a deeply mistaken 
theory, yet a scientifically relevant one. Regarding our classification 
of claim types proposed above, eliminativism by total explanatory 
failure should be associated to type A claims—Indeed, Churchland 
(1981) does not only argue for the elimination of ‘propositional at-
titude’ but also for the non-existence of propositional attitudes. In 
turn, eliminativism by causal exclusion is better associated to type B 
claims, since causal exclusion eliminativist arguments are primarily 
aimed at ontological elimination—perhaps, in the absence of better 
and more precise terms, there was even a time when talk of demons, 
phlogiston and the like was useful even though their putative refer-
ents were considered highly ontologically suspect.
The types of arguments which are theoretically inadequate as 
per Heterogeneity Eliminativism include both eliminativism due 
to explanatory vagueness and eliminativism due to metaphysical 
vagueness. Eliminativism by Explanatory Vagueness (e.g., ‘in-
nate’, innateness, etc.) argues that, because a given term has no 
determinate analysis, it should be rejected. Someone endorsing 
this type of eliminativism may or may not go on to argue that a 
given vague concept entails the ontological rejection of the type 
of thing this concept might putatively designate, depending on 
whether some intermediate premises are provided to show that 
this may be the case. Eliminativism due to metaphysical vagueness 
(e.g., moral properties) argues that we should reject the existence 
of a given type of properties or facts on the grounds that their 
existence would require that we previously accept the existence 
of some certain types of things that are too strange, confused or 
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improbable, given what we know and commonly think about ev-
erything else.
Explanatory Vagueness eliminativist arguments can be associat-
ed to any of the three types of claims. For example, as Cowie (2009) 
illustrates it, the many different mental states and processes that 
can be associated with the term ‘memory’ have led memory experts 
in different fields to be eliminativists about ‘memory’ yet not about 
memory. So, in this case, ‘memory’ eliminativism by Explanatory 
Vagueness is best associated with type B eliminativist claims. How-
ever, when some appropriate premises are included such that the 
eliminativist argument about ‘memory’ is also intended to support 
the rejection of memory, then memory eliminativism by Explanato-
ry Vagueness is best associated with type A.17 In turn, even though 
terms such as ‘memory’ happen to be theoretically vague, some 
may still deem them useful terms for serious explanatory purposes 
(e.g., Hampton, 2010; Strohminger & Moore, 2010), irrespective of 
whether their referents are thought not to exist. In this latter case, 
the use of ‘memory’ can be regimented for convenience in certain 
classificatory schemes, thus meeting conditions for theoretical ad-
equacy such as explanatory unification (cf. Margolis & Laurence, 
2010). This third form of eliminativism by Explanatory Vagueness 
is then best associated with claims of type C.
17 A related example can be found in Machery (2009), where it is contended that the term ‘concept’ 
should eliminated from the theoretical vocabulary of psychology on the grounds that what psycholo-
gists call concepts do not really form a single natural kind, and that keeping this notion would hinder 
the progress of that science.
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Table 1: Taxonomy of eliminativist arguments and claims.
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Conclusion
In this paper, I have provided a provisional general taxonomy for 
systematising what amounts to a family of related types of elimina-
tivist arguments and claims. The proposed classification is grounded 
on the analysis of different types of eliminativisms. Surveying elimi-
nativist arguments and claims in different domains has helped to 
build a picture of the different ways people can be eliminativist about 
some type of thing. While all eliminativist arguments are aimed at 
rejecting some type of thing, they differ from one another in the way 
that eliminativists argue that a certain candidate for eliminativism 
fails to be theoretically adequate, as well as the scope of their related 
eliminativist claims. I have chosen to set out a taxonomical format 
which benefits from related proposals and discussions developed by 
Cowie (2009). The result is a general classification that reflects the 
way Cowie’s proposal could generalise as a taxonomy of most (if not 
all) of the available kinds of eliminativist projects.
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